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The Constructive Receipt of
Dividends by Stockholders of a
Closely Held Corporation
Part II*
By W LiAmi CaAmus BRAFnOD**
Section 162(a) (1) of the 1954 Code states that "there shall
be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business including-(a) a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered.... ." This section is the same as Section 23(a) of the
1939 Code and was not changed. Whether the payment to of-
ficers is in the form of a fixed salary, bonus, stock purchase
option or other forms of fringe benefits intended as additional
compensation, it is necessary that all such payments or benefits
when considered together pass the Code test of "reasonable-
ness".' Under the Code, the Commissioner has authority to
determine whether a particular salary deduction is reasonable,
and in keeping with the general rule that a taxpayer must sus-
tain the burden of proof as to deductions, the corporation must
prove that the compensation was reasonable under all the cir-
cumstances.' This requirement of reasonableness is a constant
source of controversy. It is primarily directed against officer-
stockholders of close corporations to prevent a corporate deduc-
o This is part I of a thesis submitted in partial fufillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Laws in the Graduate College of the University of
Illinois, 1958. The third and final part will be published in a forthcong issue
of the Kentucky Law journal. Part one was published in 46 Ky. L. J. (Summer,
1958).00 LL.B., University of Kentucky.1 Mosher, Tax Problems of Compensating the Corporate Executive, 8 J. Tax-
ation 37 (1958).2 Shield Co., 2 T.C. 463 (1943):
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tion for payments which should be treated as distributions of
earnings by the corporation to the stockholders. The usual
ground for disallowance or reduction of the compensation is that
the amount paid is unreasonable, although the Commissioner
may also contend that part of the compensation is in effect pay-
ment of a constructive dividend. The regulations issued under
section 162(a) (1) state: 3
An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a dis-
tribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in
the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practi-
cally all of whom draw salaries. If in such case the sal-
aries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar
services, and the excessive payments correspond or bear
a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or
employees, it would seem likely that the salaries are not
paid wholly for services rendered, but that the excessive
payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock.
The above regulation thus puts stockholders of close corpora-
tions on notice. An analysis of the cases indicates that the regula-
tions reflect the conclusions of the courts. The decisions lay
down no hard and fast rules, but merely state certain factors
which will be used in determining the question of reasonable-
ness. One or more of these factors may be present in any given
case. Likewise, the weight which the courts attach to these
factors vary from case to case. To attempt any determination of
the relative weight or the controlling effect which any one
factor will play in a particular case would, therefore, be futile.
Only those factors which the courts have mentioned in the
determination of reasonableness are set forth.
1. Bona fide employment relationship. The first question in
determining whether amounts paid are deductible from corpor-
ate income as ordinary and necessary business expenses is whether
there is an actual bona fide employment relationship between
the recipient and the corporation. This question exists quite
apart from the requirement of reasonableness inasmuch as the
Code specifically requires that the compensation must be for
services actually rendered. Thus, it is not enough that a person
be carried on the payrolls of the corporation; he must "actually"
3 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg., see. 1.162-7(b) (1) (1956).
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render some services. In Outlet Clothing Co.,4 the corporation
made payments of $500 to each of the wives of the stockholder-
officers, who were also directors of the corporation. When the
corporation sought to deduct these amounts, the payments were
denied in full on the basis that the evidence did not show that
these directors participated in director's meetings or has rend-
ered any type of services to the corporation. Not only will a
deduction be denied altogether where no services have been
rendered, but where the employee only renders part-time services,
deduction will be allowed only for compensation which reflects
the amount of time spent in the employment relationship.5 In
general, it may be stated that after the normal employment re-
lationship is terminated, any additional compensation paid is not
deductible. In Fifteenth and Chestnut Realty Co.,6 such a
termination occurred by the death of the employee-stockholder.
Here, the two sole stockholders of the corporation agreed that
each should receive a salary of $22,500 for 80 years and if either
of them should die, this sum was to be paid to his estate for the
same period. After the death of one of the stockholders the
corporation continued to make payments to his estate and sought
to deduct this amount from the corporate income as compensa-
tion for personal services. The deduction was denied on the
ground that the deceased stockholder and former officer could
perform no services. No argument seems to have been made in
this case that the sums were a type of delayed compensation.
A significant exception to the general rule is made, however,
where the payments are to the family or dependents of a deceased
employee. It has long been recognized in the regulations and in
the cases that payments may be made to the deceased employee's
estate for a "reasonable" period following his death.7 Aside from
this exception, however, the cases leave no doubt that a bona
fide employment relationship must exist, that services must
actually be rendered by the employee, and that the compensa-
4P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 45858.
5 In Wilshire-LaCinega Gardends Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F. Supp. 938
(D.C. Cal., 1950), the Commissioners reduction from $9,000 to $2,000 of direc-
tor's salaries was upheld where they only gave a small amount of time to the
corporation.
629 B.T.A. 1030 (1934).
7U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, see. 39.23(a)-9 (-956); Mclaughlin Cormley King
Co., 11 T.C. 569 (1948).
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tion must accurately reflect the amount of time spent in the
employment relationship.
2. Role in building up the business. Since the question of
reasonableness is a factual determination in each case, it is quite
natural for the courts to determine whether it is reasonable for
this particular corporation to pay the sum in question to the
particular officer-stockholder. There seems to be a decided
trend to look more favorably upon compensation payments
made to officers who have been largely responsible for the
growth and development of the business. In Hachman's Depart-
ment Store v. Earle," the corporation was engaged in the retail
merchandising business. For the years 1943 and 1944 it paid
four principal officers (President, Vice President, Treasurer and
Secretary) salaries aggregating $95,000 and $96,000 respectively.
The Commissioner disallowed as a deduction approximately
$24,000 of the 1943 compensation and the same amount of the
1944 compensation on the ground that these sums represented
unreasonable compensation. Each of the officers had been in
the employment of the company for many years. The District
Court found for the taxpayer corporation stressing the fact that: 9
The plaintiffs business has been developed largely as a
result of-the personality, energy and business acumen of
[the] ... President, and other officers, from a smart and
obscure beginning to one of the outstanding stores in the
state of Virginia.
Although other factors were present in this case, such as addi-
tional duties performed by the officers, the court's language
leaves no doubt that the part Which the officers played in de-
veloping the business is a highly significant factor. This was
effectively brought out by the Tax Court in Hymen Friednash.10
In this case the manager of the taxpayer's bar and restaurant was
paid a fixed salary of $6,195 in 1944. Under his contract of em-
ployment, he was also entitled to receive 50% of the net profits
of the business. During 1944 net profits totaled $75,845.84, the
managers portion being $37,678.62, for a total compensation of
$43,867.62. The Commissioner determined that $24,000 repre-
8 42 AFTR 1137 (D.C. Va. 1949).
9 Id. at 1141.
10 P- 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 52026.
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sented reasonable compensation to the manager and disallowed
the excess. The Tax Court overruled the Commissioner and
allowed a deduction for the full amount. The court stressed the
fact that the manager played a significant role in developing the
business in that he "was an experienced bartender" and was
"in charge of the business from the beginning and was solely
responsible for the results of the operation". Many other cases
have stressed this factor in allowing as reasonable what might
otherwise be considered unreasonable compensation." It is
significant in the Friednash case that the compensation allowed
the manager amounted to over half of the profits of the corpora-
tion, a factor which is ordinarily detrimental to a full deduction.
3. Increase in duties. Where there is a substantial increase
in compensation over prior years, this increase is immediately
suspect and will be disallowed unless justification can be shown
by the taxpayer. Where the taxpayer fails to show that the of-
ficers performed more or different services than they did in prior
years, a deduction of the increased amount will invariably be
denied by the courts.' 2 Of course notice will be taken of general
economic conditions as justification for increases based on infla-
tionary price of goods and services. In general, increases may
be justified by a showing that additional supervisory duties
were undertaken,13 that the officer was required to work addi-
tional and longer hours due to some abnormal condition;' 4 that
additional responsibilities were undertaken by the officer in con-
nection with expansion of the corporation;' 5 or even that the
officer was responsible for obtaining machinery which the cor-
poration might not otherwise have been able to secure.'0 How-
ever, the increased salary must correspond with the increased
duties, and where the salary is doubled over previous years with
only a slight increase in duties, the increased portion will be
allowed only in part.
11Associated Dental Supply Co., 9 B.T.A. 1022 (1928); Acme Pie Co., P-H
1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 51029; Mosby Hotel Corp., P-H 1954 T. C. Mein. Dec.
see. 54288.
12 Sarfort Hosiery Mills, Inc., P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 47306.
13 John A. Dunn Co., 2 B.T.A. 955 (1927).
14Freeman Building Co., P-H 1949 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 49052.
15 J. Chas. McCullough Seed Co., P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 57310.
16Ticket Office Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.
1954).
17 SummitUle Pace Brick Co., P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 44267.
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4. Qualification of the officers. The fact that the officer is
a person who possesses unusual ability over and above that of
a normal corporate officer is an important factor in determining
whether his salary is reasonable. In Schoefer Klaussman Co.,18
the Tax Court approved a very substantial salary amounting to
approximately 50 percent of net profits to the President of a
coffee importer corporation observing that "he was considered
one of the countries foremost coffee experts and was favorably
known in foreign trade circles in several Central and South
American countries as well as in Europe". Likewise, in Bergen
Pabvis Corporation,9 the court upheld payment to three cor-
porate officers of $26,512.15 which left net profits after salaries
of only $6,967.95. In this case the court stressed the fact that
the officers not only had wide knowledge of textiles, the busi-
ness in which the corporation was engaged, but also were con-
sidered experts in this field.
Technical skill and particularly inventive ability is also of
considerable importance in determining reasonableness. In Boabar
Co.,20 the fact that the officer in question had invented, designed
and perfected practically all of the machines used by the cor-
poration was the substantially controlling factor in the court's
determination that the salary paid to him was reasonable. Man-
agerial ability has also played a part in determining the qualifi-
cations of an officer. Where it is possessed to a high degree, this
fact will bear heavily in the taxpayer's favor.21 That qualifications
of the officers are very important in the determination of reason-
ableness is demonstrated by the fact that it is reversible error for
the Tax Court to refuse to admit opinion evidence of persons
who are familiar with the abilities of such officers. 2
5. Evidence of comparable salaries. Perhaps the most im-
portant factor in determining the reasonableness of compensa-
tion is evidence of salaries paid to officers in similar businesses.
Where the compensation compares favorably with similar com-
peting businesses in the same area, it will ordinarily be held
18 P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 54173.
19 P-H 1948 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 48048.
20 7 T.C. 89 (1946).
21 Gordon J. Gaines, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 51105.
2 2 Builder's Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950).
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reasonable.2 3 However, it is not clear in a case where the Com-
missioner fails to impeach or contradict such testimony whether
the courts must give this testimony conclusive weight. The
courts of appeal for the fifth24 and sixth25 circuits hold that con-
clusive weight must be given, while the courts of appeal for the
seventh" and eighth27 circuits hold that the Tax Court is not
obligated to accept such testimony even though there is no con-
tradictory testimony on this point. In Loesch and Green Construc-
tion Co. v. Commissioner,28 officers of a competing company
testified that the salaries paid by the taxpayer corporation to its
officers were reasonable and in line with those paid by similar
companies. The Commissioner did not introduce any contrary
evidence. The Tax Court, nevertheless, found for the Commis-
sioner. The court of appeals for the sixth circuit reversed, stat-
ing in effect that the Tax Court should have accepted this testi-
mony. The court stated:
29
Their testimony was unimpeached and should have been
accepted by the Tax Court in a matter in which it had no
knowledge or experience upon which it could exercise
independent judgment; and such evidence cannot be
arbitrarily disregarded.
In R. H. Oswald Co. v. Commissioner,30 decided by the seventh
circuit, the taxpayer argued that the court should accept the
opinion of his expert witness to the effect that the salaries were
reasonable. The court stated:81
[W] e know of no reason why the opinion of an expert
such as offered in the instant case may not in the discre-
tion of the trier of the facts be rejected, even though there
is no other evidence on the subject.
In reaching its determination, the court will not only look
to the salaries paid by competing and similar businesses, but may
23 George Bernard's Inc., 8 B.T.A. 716 (1927).
2 4Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.
1951).25 Loesch and Green Const. Co. v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 210 (6th Cir.
1954k R. H. Oswald Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1950).
27 Builder's Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1952).
28 Supra note 25.
29 Id. at. 212. 80 Supra note 26.
31Id. at 9.
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go further and compare the volume of business done. In Pfeiffer
Brewing Co.,32 the court upheld salaries to officers which were
the highest in the industry where the corporation also had much
of the business and the highest percentage of net profits. How-
ever, this comparison to sales and net profits of similar businesses
can have its adverse consequences. In Builders Steel Co. v. Com-
missioner,33 the court compared the salaries with those paid by
six competing companies. The salaries were disallowed in part
largely on the fact that the evidence showed that all but one
of these companies had greater sales than taxpayer.
Another approach which the court will take is to look at the
overall salary policy of the corporation to determine whether the
compensation paid is reasonable. If it is out of line with that
paid to other officers, it may be reduced. In Mills Supplies
Corporation,4 the Commissioner's reduction was upheld where
the salary of the president and principal stockholder exceeded
the total compensation paid to five other key employees. It was
not shown that his abilities justified the disproportionate salary.
6. Relation of compensation to net profits. Reduction of a
salary deduction is usually upheld where the circumstances show
that the effect of the salary is to absorb the corporate profits
rather than to compensate for services rendered. What is sought
to be prevented is a distribution of all corporate profits in the
form of salary. Thus, in the Outlet Clothing Company case, the
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's reduction of salaries of two
corporate officers from $83,200 to $21,000 where there was only
a small amount of corporate profits left after payment of the
salaries. To the same effect see Crescent Bed Company,35 where
a reduction from $50,000 to $25,000 was sustained where it ap-
peared that after payment of these salaries practically no net in-
come was left. It is not clear where the line will be drawn. In
International Building Co.,36 the salaries were held excessive
largely because they absorbed all corporate profits in excess of
6% of invested capital. However, in Law and Credit Company,37
82 P-H 1952 T.C. Mer. Dec. sec. 52179.
83 Supra note 22.
34 P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 47313, affd. 173 F.2nd 572 (6th Cir.
1949).
85 P-H 1942 T.C. Mer. Dec. sec. 42206.
3621 B.T.A. 617 (1930).
875 B.T.A. 51 (1926).
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the Tax Court allowed higher salaries to corporate officers, ob-
serving that net income after salaries for the tax years in ques-
tion was 7.97%, 8.59% and 10.81%, which was a "fair return"
on the investment. A factor which might have influenced the
court in this case, however, was the exceptional ability of the
officers.
Many of the cases involving this question arise where a fixed
salary is paid plus a percentage of profits and where the com-
pensation is based solely on a percentage of profits. In these
cases, a distribution of dividends is more nearly approached.
In this regard, the regulations state :38
While any form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny
as a possible distribution of earnings of the enterprise, it
does not follow that payments on a contingent basis are
to be treated fundamentally on any basis different from
that applying to compensation at a flat rate. Generally
speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a
free bargain between the employer and the individual
made before the services are rendered, not influenced by
any consideration on the part of the employer other than
that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the serv-
ices of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction
even though in the actual working out of the contract it
may prove to be greater than the amount which will or-
dinarily be paid.
Even here, however, the compensation must meet the same test
of reasonableness as salary paid on a fixed basis. If the agree-
ment is reasonable when made, the fact that subsequent events
may greatly increase this percentage is not necessarily detri-
mental to the taxpayer's case. 9 This is particularly true where
the agreement is of long standing.40 The difficulty here is that
the agreement must be of an arm's-length character. Stockhold-
ers of a close corporation cannot always establish this.
7. Compensation in relation to stockholders. Payment of
compensation in proportion to stockholdings of the officers in-
vites a scrutiny as to whether the payment constitutes in part a
distribution of profits in the guise of compensation. An attack
S
8 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. see. 1.162-7(b) (2) (1956).39 Elbert Steel Corp., P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 45178.
40Draper and Co., 5 T.C. 822 (1945).
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by the Commissioner may be made directly or it may be made
indirectly by alleging that the salary paid is unreasonable and
pointing out its proportional relationship to stock as a factor
in the determination. Even where the latter factor is present,
salaries paid will still be deductible if not excessive.41 It does,
however, put the taxpayer in an unfavorable light in proving
reasonableness. Undoubtedly where such a relationship exists,
the Commissioner and the courts will require stronger evidence
of reasonableness. This is particularly true where additional
amounts of compensation are paid over and above fixed salaries.
Thus, where bonuses and salary increases are made in propor-
tion to stockholdings, the additional sums appear to be a distri-
bution of dividends rather than salary payments and the courts
very often declare these additional sums to be excessive com-
pensation. In Sarfert Hosiery Mills,42 three corporate officers
received bonuses of $3,000, $2,000 and $1,000 respectively in
addition to their regular salaries. These sums were held to be
excessive compensation by the court which made the following
observation:
43
[T]he bonus payments are in very dose proportion to
the dividend rights of the three officers involved herein,
those rights being in the ratio of sixty, forty and twenty,
while the bonuses are in the ratio of $8,000, $2,000 and
$1,000. We do not consider this relationship of great weight
in itself, but we do consider it of sufficient importance
to be worthy of consideration.
As pointed out by the court, payments corresponding to stock-
holdings are not conclusive evidence that they in part represent
a distribution of earnings; but it is significant that the courts
lay much stress on this factor, in support of a decision adverse
to the taxpayer. It would be an exceptional case where salaries
in proportion to stockholidngs would be held deductible in full."
As stated previously, no fixed rules exist in this area. The
41 New York Talking Mach. Co., 18 B.T.A. 154 (1928); Hawaiian Freight
Forwarders, Ltd., 9 T.C. 1182 (1947).
42 Supra note 12.
43 Id. at 1040.
44 K and H Realty Corp., P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 56107, was a case
where this factor was overcome. The court allowed the deduction in full where it
was shown that the officers performed equal services and that no salaries had
been paid to them for 7 out of the 18 years of the corporations existence.
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decisions vary with the particular circumstances. While it is
readily apparent that in cases of this nature fixed mechanical
rules cannot be stated which would be applicable to all situations,
some policy determinations could be made to help the situation.
It has been suggested by one author that the history of this sec-
tion "furnishes no basis whatever for the assumption of the
treasury of a visitatorial power over salary payments actually
made". 45 This would appear to be an overstatement as well as
an undesirable policy conclusion. All would agree that corporate
profits should not be withdrawn under the guise of salary. Failure
to review such payments would disrupt the whole system of
taxing corporations and render it meaningless, especially in the
case of small close corporations. Whether the power of the
Commissioner should be as broad as it is at present is another
question. The consequences can be rather severe in cases where
the corporation gets overly ambitious in the payment of salaries.
At the outset the taxpayer has two strikes against him. Not only
is the determination of the Commissioner presumptively correct,
but the courts of appeals have made it clear that the Tax Court
will not be reversed unless its decision is "so clearly out of line
with the evidence as to be arbitrary and unfair."4 In discussing
who should make the determination of whether an expense is
ordinary and necessary under this section, the Supreme Court
in Heininger v. Commissioner47 also stated:
4
Whether an expenditure is directly related to a business
and whether it is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure
questions of fact in most instances. Except where a ques-
tion of law is unmistakably involved a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals on these issues, having taken into
account the presumption supporting the Commissioner's
rulings should not be reversed by the federal appellate
courts. Careful adherence to this principal will result in
a more orderly and uniform system of tax deductions in
a field beset by innumerable complexities.
As far as the corporation is concerned, where there is a pay-
ment of excessive amounts, the deduction is limited to the pro-
45 Griswold, "New Light on a Reasonable Allowance for Salaries," 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 286,290 (1945).
40Long Island Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 593,595 (2d Cir. 1940).
47320 U.S. 467 (1943).
48 Id. at 475.
195s]
KENTucKY LAw JOURNAL
portion of the payment which constitutes reasonable compensa-
tion.49 However, not only will the corporation lose its business
deduction, but the payments made to stockholders may be
treated as constructive dividends. 50 If a direct attack has been
made by the Commissioner by alleging that the purported com-
pensation was not actually salary but a disguised dividend distri-
bution, it would seem to follow that the recipient will be taxed
accordingly. However, where the attack has been made indi-
rectly by alleging that the salary was unreasonable, whether the
disallowed excess will be compensation in his hands or a dividend
is not clear. There is some indication in the regulations that
the taxability of this excess will depend on the circumstances of
each case. They state:5
The income tax liability of the recipient in respect of an
amount ostensibly paid to him as compensation, but not
allowed to be deducted as such by the payor, will depend
on the circumstances of each case. Thus, in the case of
excessive payments by corporations, if such payments
correspond or bear a close relationship to stock holdings,
and are found to be a distribution of earnings or profits,
the excessive payment will be treated as a dividend... In
the absence of evidence to justify other treatment, exces-
sive payments for salaries or other compensation for
personal services will be included in the gross income of
the recipient.
The regulations seem to make it clear that the Commissioner
will treat excessive compensation received by stockholders as
dividends if such payments bear a close relationship to stock-
holdings. Thus, since they are dividends and not compensation
in his hands, they will not be taxable to him as ordinary income
unless the payment was out of earnings and profits. If there are
no earnings and profits to cover these proportional payments, it
would necessarily follow that the excessive amounts received
would constitute a return of capital.
There is very little authority on how a sole stockholder who
received excessive compensation would be taxed. It is to be
49 Outlet Clothing Co., supra note 4.
5 0 Newman, The Tax Liability of the Recipient of a Disallowed Business
Deduction, 28 Taxes 811 (1950).
51 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.162-8 (1956).
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noted, however, that the regulations do not expressly apply un-
less there are earnings and profits available to render the divi-
dend taxable. Thus, he should be able to prove that the exces-
sive payments are dividends, not compensation and thus non-
taxable if there are insufficient earnings and profits to support
a dividend.2 What complicates these matters is that the three
year statute of limitations has ordinarily run by the time that the
deduction is disallowed to the corporation and held a taxable
dividend in the hands of the stockholders. He may find that
what has been reported by him as income is really a return of
capital because the corporation had insufficient earnings and
profits to support a taxable dividend. May he now secure an
adjustment? It would appear that he cannot file a claim for
refund as the prior tax years are closed by the statute of limita-
tions.
In addition to the fact that the stockholder may find him-
self taxable on a distribution which was in reality a return of
capital, he may find himself in hot water on another score.
Where the corporation is insolvent or is rendered insolvent by
the payment of an excessive salary, it may be unable to pay the
tax deficiency arising from the disallowance. In this case the
Commissioner will likely assert transferee liability against the
stockholder to the extent of the excessive portion of the salary.
Thus, in Healy v. Commissioner,53 the officers received salaries
from a closely held corporation in which they were both officers
and stockholders. Each was on a cash basis and each reported
the salary in the year received. The salaries were subsequently
held excessive and deficiencies in income tax were determined
against the corporation. The Commissioner also determined that
the officers were liable as transferees under Section 811 of the
1939 Code (now section 6501) for the corporation's deficiency.
After payment of the liability the officers sought to exclude
5-In Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345 (3rd Cir. 1951), compensation paid to
two daughters of the controlling stockholder was held excessive. The excessive
amounts were held to be compensation to the daughters, the court ointing to the
fact that the amounts paid by the employer were paid and received as compensa-
tion for services. Accord, Poorman v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.
1942). In these cases, however, the employees were not stockholders and the
amounts were held compensation in the face of their contention that the excess
represented a gift from the corporation. It is obvious that the court could not hold
that they had received dividends.
53 345 U.S. 278 (1952).
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from taxable income in the year of receipt such part of the ex-
cessive salary as was paid out by the application of the transferee
liability, contending that an adjustment should be made in the
year of the original receipt of the salary. The court held that
under the "claim of right doctrine" the officers realized income
in the year of receipt to the full amount and the tax could not
be recomputed. The court stated: 54
A rule which required that the adjustment be made in the
earlier year of receipt instead of the later year of payment
would generally be unfavorable to the taxpayer, for the
statute of limitations would frequently bar any adjustment
of the tax liability for the earlier year.
In the ordinary case, the court's reasoning is proper and would
thus appear to provide an advantage for the taxpayer, since he
would be entitled to a loss deduction in the year of repayment
of the amount that was earlier included in his income. However,
as discussed previously, where the corporation had insufficient
earnings to support a taxable dividend in the first instance,
not being able to recompute his taxes for the prior year leaves
the stockholder holding the "bag" which has been considerably
lightened by taxes. In addition, a loss deduction in the later
year may not materially lessen his taxable income. If he had no
taxable income, a loss deduction would be valueless to him. In
this situation, however, Section 1341 of the Code may provide
some relief if certain conditions are met.55
II
BFNTALs AND RoYALTms PAmD TO SToCKHOLDERS
Rents and royalties are useful devices for siphoning off earn-
ings and profits of a closely held corporation. Corporations which
occupy property, title to which is held by shareholders, may pay
out a portion of the corporate earnings in the form of rent and
royalties and deduct these payments as business expenses. Sec-
54 Id. at 284.
55 If the repaid amount exceeds $3,000, sec. 1341 permits the taxpayer to
reduce his tax for the year of repayment by the amount of tax for the previous
year which was attributable to the inclusion of this amount. However, if a smaller
tax liability results from simply deducting the repaid amount in the year of re-
payment, the taxpayer must take this deduction. In either event, however, the
adjustment is made for the year of repayment. The return for the prior year in
which the item was received is not reopened.
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lion 162(a) (8) of the 1954 Code allows as a business expense
deduction "rentals and other payments required to be made as
a condition to the continued use or possession, for the purpose
of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity."
This section does not expressly require that rental or royalty pay-
ments must be reasonable. However, it has been held that allow-
able rental payments must meet the test of reasonableness.
5 6
Rentals and royalty payments are seldom questioned except
where the transaction is between related parties. Because of the
close relationship of the landlord-shareholder and tenant-cor-
poration, payments of rents and royalties to a stockholder are
usually scrutinized by the Commissioner to determine whether
the amounts are reasonable or whether the corporation is paying
for property which it does not actually use. Where it is deter-
mined that the rental is excessive, the corporation is limited to
a deduction in an amount which is considered reasonable for
the use of the property.
5 7
Originally the traditional test as to whether a given rental
or royalty was deductible was whether it was "reasonable" in the
light of similar leases in the general areas.58 However, in Stanley
Imerman, 9 the Tax Court seemed to have abandoned this test.
In this case a partnership was using property owned by the
mother of the partners under a lease which provided for a fixed
rental plus a percentage of the gross sales. The original lease
was executed in 1938 when sales were low; but the war had
increased sales to the point that the rent totaled $88,206.75 in
1941. The Commissioner disallowed $21,206.75 of this amount
as a rental deduction on the grounds that only $12,000 consti-
tuted a "reasonable" rent. The Tax Court held that the Code
does not limit the deduction for rental payments to a reasonable
sum and that the only requirement is that the payments actually
constitute rent rather than dividends or gifts. The court stated: 60
56 reenspon v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 917 (5th C•r. 1946); Lincoln Elec-
tric Co. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949), held that reasonable-
ness is inherent in the phrase "ordinary and necessary expenses."
57 M.L. Cottingham, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 56186.5 8 Monnah Park Block Co., P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 451.40.
59 7 T.C. 1030 (1946).
60 Id. at 1037.
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Here the ... [Commissioner] has merely determined that
$12,000 constituted 'a reasonable rental on the building'
• . . He has made no determination that the amount dis-
allowed was in fact or in character something other than
rent.... We find nothing which might form a basis for
claiming that the renewal of the lease . . ., was not an arm's
length transaction or that the payments were of any other
nature or character than rents.
Subsequent decisions of the Tax Court have paid lip service to
this decision. In Manos Amusements, Inc.,61 rental payments
made to the wife of the controlling stockholder of the lessee
corporation were disallowed in part on the ground that the lease
was less than an arm's-length transaction. The court, citing the
Imerman decision, stated:62
[W] here rent is paid or incurred as the result of an
ann's length transaction and there is no evidence that any
part of the payments were in fact gifts or distributions of
dividends,... [this section] does not limit the deduction
for rental to a reasonable amount.
Similarly, in Abe Wender,63 the court considered the controll-
ing issue to be the arm's-length nature of the transaction and
not the reasonableness of the rentals. Here the taxpayer oper-
ated a liquor store on premises owned by his mother. The prem-
ises were leased at a rental of 5 percent of the gross sales with
a minimum guarantee of $200 per month. The rental amounted
to $17,000 in 1949. Prior to this lease, the property had been
rented for only $125 a month. The Commissioner disallowed
payments in excess of $8,600 a year. The court upheld the Com-
missioner stating that the taxpayer failed to prove that the pay-
ments made by him under the lease in excess of $3,600 per year
were required to be made as a condition to the continued use
of the premises. In other words, the court concluded that the
arrangements must have been something less than an arm's-
length transaction.
After there has been a determination that the transaction
was not at arm's-length, the question necessarily arises as to
61 P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 51226.
62 Id. at 654.
63 P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 56081.
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what is a reasonable allowance under the circumstances. There
is an additional question as to the tax status of the disallowed
rental in the hands of the shareholder. If the disallowed portion
is treated as a rental payment in the hands of the lessor-share-
holder, it will be taxed in full to him as ordinary income. At
least one case has held that the excessive portion constituted
rental income." However, it is generally stated that such excess
constitutes a distribution of a dividend to the stockholder. 5 If
the excess rental is treated as a distribution of property to the
stockholder, and if the corporation does not have sufficient
earnings and profits to cover a dividend, the excess amount re-
ceived by the stockholder would properly constitute a return
of capital and not a receipt of rent. However, no cases have
been found where the stockholder has had occasion to argue
that the excessive rentals were non-taxable to him because the
corporation had insufficient earnings and profits to make a tax-
able distribution.
The approach of thelmerman case appears to be more equit-
able for a more basic reason. Where there are several stockhold-
ers in a corporation and one of them rents property to the cor-
poration in an arm's-length bargained transaction at a rental in
excess of normal and usual rental, it seems inequitable that the
other stockholders and the corporation should be penalized by
denial of a deduction because they have made a bad bargain.
It is not clear as to how far the Imerman decision will be ex-
tended. If the Tax Court adhers to the philosophy of that case,
the deduction in the foregoing illustration would be allowed and
would be sustained upon review by the court of appeals. The
attitude of the court of appeals in these matters was well stated
in Limericks v. Commissioner,66 as follows: 67
The substance of the transaction is for the Tax Court to
determine upon the appraisal of all the facts, and its deci-
sion must be sustained if there is a rational basis for its
conclusion.
64 Greenspun, 7 T.C.M. 509 (1948).
65 Peterson and Pegau Baking Co., 2 B.T.A. 637 (1925); Chicago Shipping
and Storage Co., 15 B.T.A. 431 (1929); Tressler v. Commissioner, 206 F.25
538 (4th Cir. 1953); Roy Champayne, 26 T.C. 634 (1956).
66 165 F.2d 483 (5th Cr. 1948).
67 Id. at 484.
1958]
KENTucy LAw JouRNAL[V
Where there is a sale of property by the corporation to its
stockholders followed by a lease-back, a rental deduction will be
allowed provided there has been an arm's-length transaction,6"
It is likely, however, that the Commissioner will question the
arrangement and attempt to disallow the whole amount of the
rents and royalties and treat them as constructive dividends to
the stockholders. In many cases the sale and transfer will be
disregarded on the ground that the transaction was a sham and
a tax avoidance arrangement.
The first of these arrangements involving a sale and lease-
back was a transfer on trust. Although corporate leases were not
involved the basic principle is the same. In A. A. Skemp,69 the
taxpayer created a trust for his wife and children and transferred
to this trust a building that he used in his business. On the same
day, the trustee leased the building to the taxpayer at a rental of
$500 a month for two years. A deduction of the rental was denied
by the Tax Court on the ground that the taxpayer had reserved
a leasehold from the transfer and had simply promised to make
a monthly gift of $500 to the trust for a period of two years. On
appeal, the seventh circuit court of appeals reversed, holding
that the transaction gave rise to a real obligation to pay rent and
that it would not be presumed that the trustee would breach his
fiduciary duty. The attitude of the Tax Court as to this type of
arrangement was again expressed in Helen C. Brown.70 Here
partners acquired coal lands and transferred these properties
to trustees for the benefit of minor children and then arranged
a lease-back of these properties to the partnership in considera-
tion of the payment of rents and royalties. The trust was valid
and irrevocable. The Tax Court disallowed a deduction of these
payments. The court of appeals reversed,71 on the basis that the
Skemp case was controlling. In spite of the fact that the Commis-
sioner has entered his nonacquiescence in the Skemp and Brown
cases, 72 the Tax Court now considers them controlling. In John
6 Drilling and Service, Inc., P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 56272.
69 8 T.G. 415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
70 12 T.C. 1095 (1949).
71 180 F.2d 926 (3d C.r. 1950).
72 Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 Cum Bull. 20, holds that rental payments when
made to a trust to which the settlor has transferred property do not constitute
deductible expenses but should be treated as gifts on the theory that such a trans-
action is in substance a diversion of income within the family group.
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T. Potter,73 the taxpayer created a trust for the benefit of his wife
and children and transferred to this trust a patent. In consider-
ation for the use of the patent in his business, he made royalty
payments to the trust. Deduction of these amounts was upheld
by the Tax Court.
In spite of these trust cases, where the form of the transac-
tion has seemed to be of controlling significance, several cor-
porate cases seem to point in the other direction, perhaps in a
much too restrictive degree. In the year following the Skemp
case, the Tax Court decided Ingle Coal Corporation.74 In that
case the corporation held a coal mining lease for a period of 20
years under which it was required to pay a royalty of five cents
a ton. The corporation was dissolved and the assets including
the lease were distributed to the stockholders. Simultaneously
the stockholders created a new corporation and transferred this
lease to it in consideration for its stock and the assumption of
the debts of the old corporation and an additional royalty of
five cents a ton on the lease. The stock of the new corporation
was issued to the stockholders in the same proportion in which
they held stock in the old corporation. The Tax Court held that
this was an "integrated transaction" and that no consideration
had passed to the taxpayer corporation to support the royalty
and that the purported royalty was therefore a distribution of
corporate profits and was not deductible from corporate income.
On appeal the circuit court affirmed.75 Similarly, in R. E. L.
Finley,76 two controlling stockholders of a corporation engaged in
general construction work transferred their stock in the corpora-
tion to their wives. The wives then dissolved the corporation
and transferred the assets to themselves. They then formed a
partnership to engage in the rental of construction equipment
and the taxpayers formed a partnership to engage in general
construction work. The latter used the equipment owned by
their wives at will without any formal lease arrangement. Rental
deduction was denied to the taxpayers for the use of this equip-
ment, the court pointing out among other things the unrestricted
7s27 T.C. 200 (1956).
7410 T.C. 1199 (1948).
75 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949).
76 27 T.C. 413 (1956).
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control the taxpayers had over their wives' property. A rental
deduction was also denied in Riverpoint Lace Works, 7 where
two sole stockholders and their wives organized a new corpora-
tion and transferred to it for a small consideration the property
upon which the taxpayer corporation was doing business. The
court, while recognizing the possibility of a valid arrangement,
stated:
7
The transaction between the petitioner and J and G (new
corporation) requires careful scrutiny because they were
family corporations which could use legal formalities to
give a false appearance where substance would be lack-
ing .... This arrangement was a sham concocted by the
two brothers and their wives on poor advice, for non-busi-
ness purposes....
The thing that appeared to be detrimental to the taxpayer in
this case was the fact that the property sold to the new corpora-
tion was worth far more than the selling price. Also, the annual
rental was more than 68 percent of the sales price and of the
small amount of rent paid under the lease, most of it was bor-
rowed back from the corporation.
Notwi1lstanding the statement of the court in the Riverpoint
case that a sale and lease-back arrangement would be recognized
where there was a good business purpose, the case of Armston
v. Commissioner,79 leaves doubt. Here the corporation purchased
expensive heavy equipment to carry on its construction business.
It was decided that it was not good business policy for the cor-
poration to have substantially all of its capital and surplus tied
up in heavy fixed equipment when funds were needed for the
payment of current debts. The equipment was sold to one of
the two sole stockholders but with the understanding that the
company would lease it back at an agreed rental. The money was
borrowed by the stockholder-purchaser from a bank for this pur-
pose. The Tax Court refused to allow any deduction for the
rentals on the ground that the sale and lease-back arrangement
was without "substance" and that the alleged rentals were ac-
tually distributions of corporate profits. The court of appeals
77P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 54143.
78 Id. at 467.
79 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
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affirmed, laying much stress on the fact that the equipment
transferred would not have been sold on the open market with
competitive bids and stated:80
[S]ince the company required the use of the equipment
for its construction work, no sale of the equipment would
have been permitted to an outsider, or anyone who might
have dealt at arm's length with the company in the trans-
action.
If the statement of the court is taken literally, it would appear
that all of these sale and lease-back arrangements will fail to
secure court sanction. In no case would the corporation sell to
outsiders who might charge excessive rentals. According to the
court, apparently no others may deal with the corporation in an
arm's-length transaction.
If the corporation has a good business purpose for the sale,
and all the formalities of a valid sale are adhered to, and the
selling price and the rentals are fair and are in line with the
amounts that would have been secured in an arm's-length sale or
lease to the general public, the courts should recognize the
arrangement. Under the present status of the decisions, however,
a sale and lease-back between a stockholder and his closely
held corporation has little chance of recognition.
III
DisTamurnoNs oF POPERTY AND BARGAN SALES AND PURCHASES
When a corporation makes an ordinary distribution in cash
to its stockholders, the only question is whether such distribu-
tion is from the corporation's "earnings and profits."8' However,
it often happens that a distribution will be made in property in
kind. Under the 1939 Code the tax consequences of distributions
in kind was uncertain. However, it is now apparently settled
under the 1954 Code that the amount of any such distribution
to the individual stockholders is the fair market value of the prop-
erty received. 2 In Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust,83 decided
under the 1939 Code provisions, it was held that a distribution
80 Id. at 533.
81 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 316(a).
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, see. 301(b)(1)(A).
83 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954).
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by a corporation of appreciated property was taxable in full to
the stockholders notwithstanding the fact that the corporation
did not have earnings and profits equal to the fair market value
of the property. The court held that since the earnings and
profits exceeded the book value or cost of the property to the
corporation, the fair market value of the property distributed
was taxable as dividend income. The regulations, however,
have modified the Hirshon decision, and provide in effect that
such a distribution of appreciated property by a corporation
is a dividend only to the extent of the earnings and profits of
the corporation at the date of the distribution. 4 The excess of
the fair market value of the property distributed in kind over the
earnings and profits will be treated as a return of capital and
applied in reduction of the basis of the stock.
It often happens that instead of distributing the property
in kind, a corporation will sell property to its stockholders for
less than fair market value. A transaction of this kind may also
result in a "constructive dividend" to the purchasing stockholder
or stockholders. The regulations -provide:85
If property is transferred to a shareholder which is not
a corporation for an amount less than its fair market value
in a sale or exchange, such shareholder shall be treated
as having received a distribution to which section 301
applies. In such case, the amount of the distribution shall
be the difference between the amount paid for the prop-
erty and its fair market value. (Emphasis added).
Thus, under the regulations, any such excess would be a "con-
structive dividend" in the hands of the stockholders and would
be taxed as ordinary income provided there are sufficient earn-
ings and profits to cover the distribution. 6
The validity of the regulations quoted above was first pre-
sented in the case of Frank E. Taplin.87 In that case a majority
stockholder of a corporation purchased from the corporation
shares of stock having a fair market value of $162,000 for a con-
sideration of $37,860. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency
s4 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. see. 1.316(a)(2) and (3) (1955).
85 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.301-1(j) (1955).
86 Supra note 81.
87 12 B.T.A. 1264 (1928).
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based upon the difference between the fair market value and the
price paid as a dividend received by the shareholder. He relied
upon the applicable regulations which provided: 8
Where property is sold by a corporation to a shareholder
... , for an amount substantially less than its fair market
value each shareholder... shall include in gross income the
difference between the amount paid for the property and
the amount of its fair market value. (Emphasis added).
The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner's deter-
mination, holding that the transaction was not a bona fide sale
since the parties were not dealing at arm's-length. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed,89 holding that the regulation was
without force to impose tax liability on a stockholder of a cor-
poration who merely purchased property from it for an amount
substantially less than its fair market value. The court stated
that controlling statutes were not broad enough to support the
regulation in question. The same result was reached in the sub-
sequent case of Commissioner v. Van Vorst.90 In that case a tax-
payer, who owned almost all of the outstanding shares, purchased
real estate-rom the corporation for $54,559.60 which was the
cost at which the corporation had purchased the property and
carried it on its books. The fair market value at the time of the
purchase was $154,559.60. The Commissioner assessed a defi-
ciency relying on the same regulation which the sixth circuit
had disapproved in the Taplin case. The court held that the
regulation did not control and that the mere interest of the stock-
holder in the corporation does not convert a bargain purchase into
a realization of taxable income. The Commissioner contended
that the gross inadequacy of the consideration and the relation-
ship between the parties made what was called a sale in reality
a distribution of assets. The court conceded that such a case
might arise but stated that this case did not fit that pattern. In
spite of this early rebuff, the Commissioner continued to rely on
the regulations and his persistence finally bore fruit in Timber-
lake v. Commissioner.91 There the corporation bought stock in
88 Id. at 1271.
8941 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1930).
90 59 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1932).
91132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942).
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another corporation and subsequently sold this stock to a stock-
holder for a price substantially less than its fair market value.
At the time of the sale the corporation had a large surplus from
which dividends could have been declared. The Commissioner
again applied his regulations, and this time with success. The
court held that the excess of fair market value over the purchase
price was taxable income to the stockholder and stated:
92
We accept the regulation.., as a correct interpretation of
the statutes since its long continuance and application to
frequent reenactments justifies the inference that it has
received Congressional approval.
The court further held that the case was controlled by Palmer
v. Commissioner,93 where the Supreme Court had stated that a
bargain sale may be as effective as a formal declaration of a
dividend to stockholders, if in its purpose of effect, it actually
brings about a distribution of corporate earnings. The court then
held that the Taplin and Van Vorst cases would not be followed
and stated:
4
It is of no importance that the transfer assumed the form
of a sale and that there was no express declaration of a
dividend. The substance of the transaction determines its
character for purposes of taxation.
Thus, it seems to be settled that the regulation is here to stay.
It has been approved and applied in several subsequent cases,
where the stockholder has bought property from the corporation
at a bargain price.- It is to be noted that the former requirement
that the consideration be "substantially less" than the fair market
value of the property has been eliminated from the present regu-
lation. Thus any difference may be subject to taxation. So long
as there are corporate earnings sufficient to cover the difference
between the fair market value and purchasing price, the stock-
holder will almost assuredly be held to have realized a construc-
tive dividend. In Stanley Waldheim,96 it was held that the stock-
92 Id. at 261.
93302 U.S. 63 (1937). This case was decided by the Supreme Court subse-
quent to the Taplin and Van Vorst decisions.
04 Supra note 91 at 261.
95 Elizabeth Strake Trust, 1 T.C. 1131 (1943); Stanley Waldheim, 25 T.C.
839 (1956), aff'd., 244 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1957).
06 Supra note 95.
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holder was taxable on the difference between the fair market
value and the purchase price even though the corporation had a
deficit. The court held that all that was required is that there be
earnings and profits in the year of sale sufficient to cover the
difference.
Ordinarily, a payment to a stockholder as the purchase price
for property is not a corporate distribution. However, by appli-
cation of the bargain sale principles, it should follow that if a
stockholder sells property to his corporation at an inflated price,
the excess of the purchase price over fair market value may be
taxed as a constructive dividend to him. Even though the au-
thority in this area is limited, the indications are that this will be
the result. Such a contention was made by the Commissioner in
George Staub.97 There the taxpayers, who were partners, trans-
ferred partnership assets to a corporation which they owned for
the sum of $90,610.35. The tangible assets consisted of machinery
which had a market value of only $29,331.50. The resulting gain
of $61,278.85 was reported as a long term capital gain. The Com-
missioner assessed a deficiency on the theory that this sum was
a dividend distribution by the corporation which at the time had
considerable earnings and profits. The court held that since
there was a transfer of a going business, the good will of such a
business justified the full price and refused to sustain the Com-
missioner. In Jacob M. Kaplan,0 8 the taxpayer who was the sole
owner of all the stock of a corporation sold to the corporation
172 shares of stock which had cost him $1,229,890 in cancella-
tion of his indebtedness to the corporation. It was held by the
court that the excess of the purchase price over the fair market
value was a dividend to the stockholder. It would appear, there-
fore, that since all sales to a close corporation will be carefully
scrutinized by the Commissioner, care must be exercised to in-
sure that the purchase price approximates the fair market value
at the time of sale to avoid receipt of an uninvited dividend.
A corporation may grant to its stockholders an "option" to
purchase corporate property at less than its fair market value.
These options are usually for the purchase of corporate stock or
stock in another corporation. It is apparently settled that tax-
9720 T.C. 834 (1953).
9821 T.C. 134 (1953).
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able stock rights give rise to income only when exercised or sold. 9
The Commissioner following the decision in Palmer v. Commis-
sioner,100 has ruled: 101
[T]his office is of opinion that stock right issued . . .
are taxable as dividends to the stockholders only when
exercised by them. Prior to that time, there has been no
distribution by the corporation and the statutory defini-
tion of a dividend has not been met.
The question whether a taxable dividend results from the grant-
ing and exercise of an option has arisen in several cases. One of
the first cases was Palmer v. Commissioner.102 In that case the
corporation which held stock purchase rights in another corpora-
tion granted an option to its stockholders to purchase this stock.
When granted the market value was equal to the option price.
However, when the taxpayer exercised his rights, the market
value was far in excess of the option price. The Commissioner
ruled that the rights to subscribe were dividends, and assessed
a deficiency against petitioner based on their market value on the
dates when the taxpayer was first entitled to exercise them. The
Tax Court found that there was no intention to distribute cor-
porate earnings and that the transaction was a bona fide sale.
The court of appeals reversed. On appeal, the Supreme Court
agreed with the Tax Court, holding that it was necessary to
show that the transaction was in purpose or effect used as an
implement for the distribution of corporate earnings. The court
further held that the mere issue of rights to subscribe and their
receipt is not a dividend stating:
10
Even though the rights have a market or exchange value,
they are not dividends in the statutory sense.... They are
at most options or continuing offers, potential sources of
income to the stockholder through sale or the exercise
of the rights.
99 Section 805 (a) of the 1954 Code excludes from gross income distribu-
tions from a corporation in its own stock of rights to acquire such stock. It is
only when a distribution is (1) made in discharge of preference dividends, or (2)
is at the election of any of the shareholders payable in its stock or property
(money), that it becomes a taxable distribution.
100 Supra note 93.
101 G.C.M. 25063, 1947-1 Gum. Bull. 45.
102 Supra note 93.
108 Id. at 70.
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The controlling factor in the court's determination was that at
the time the options were granted the sales price represented
their market value. The court held that the transaction was not
converted into a dividend by the fact that at a later date when the
stock was delivered market value had increased. The court
stated:'04
Its character is not altered by the fluctuations of a specu-
lative market, after the corporate action which defines the
character of the transaction has been taken.
The effect of the Palmer case was that if the option price approxi-
mated market value at the time it was granted by the corpora-
tion, no dividend resulted even though market value was far in
excess at the time the option was exercised. In Choate v. Com-
missioner,0 5 however, the court ignored value at the time of
adoption of the plan. There the corporation issued to its com-
mon stockholders "rights" to purchase unissued preferred stock.
The taxpayer received 10,000 such rights which had a fair market
value of $4,375 at the time of receipt. He then gave his rights
to several members of his family who exercised them. The Board
of Tax Appeals had held that $4,375, the value of the rights at
the time of receipt, was income to the taxpayer. He argued that
he was subject to no tax. The court did not agree with either
contention holding that it was bound by the Palmer case. The
court stated:O'0
The court in the Palmer case makes basic the corporate
intention to distribute corporate earnings. We take it that
the essential factor is an 'objective', not a 'subjective', in-
tention, i.e., that a substantial 'spread' would be regarded
as showing that such an intention existed regardless of
what the corporation officers said or did not say.
The court further stated that if the contract is for a sale at its fair
market value so that no spread then exists:
10 7
There is no corporate intention to distribute profits, and
therefore, no dividend. If, after such a sale, or after such
a contract to sell, the market value of the property in-
104 Id. at 78.
105 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
IO6 Id. at 686.
307 Tbid.
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creases, so that a 'spread' beneficial to the stockholders
then accrues, that 'spread' is no more taxable than if the
purchasers had not been stockholders, for an intention to
distribute that 'spread' cannot be imputed to the company.
The court went on to state, however, that if at the time of the
sale or at the time the contract was entered into there was a sub-
stantial spread favorable to the stockholders that:108
[I] t will be considered that there was a corporation in-
tention to distribute that spread, i.e. that a corporate dis-
tribution of earnings, and therefore a dividend was in-
tended.
The court held that even if there is a substantial spread when
the option is issued, the Palmer case required that any increase
in spread between the date of issuance of the options and their
exercise is not a dividend, and since there is no distribution until
the option is exercised, the taxable dividend cannot exceed the
spread which exists when that option is exercised. Thus, the
effect of the Choate case was to hold that the exercise of the
right produces income measured by the "spread" between the
option price and market value, either at the time of issuance
or at the time of exercise, whichever is less. Notwithstanding,
the Choate case the Commissioner has ruled in effect that if the
rights are exercised, the amount to be taken into income as a
dividend is the excess of the fair market value of the new stock
received over the subscription price.10 9 Since the ruling cites
the Choate case it may be that the spread referred to means the
spread existing at the time of the granting or at the time of
exercise of the option.
However, it may well be that the complete spread will be
taxable to the stockholder as a dividend. This appears to be the
trend in employee stock option cases. In Commissioner v.
Smith, 10 the same principal was involved as in Palmer. There the
corporation gave an employee, as compensation for his services,
an option to purchase from the employer certain stock in an-
other corporation at a price not less than the then value of the
stock. However, in 1988, when the option was exercised, the
108 Id. at 687.
109 Supra note 101.
110324 U.S. 177 (1945).
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market value of the stock was greater than the option price.
This excess amount was held by the Tax Court to be compensa-
tion in the year in which the stock was received. The Supreme
Court upheld the Tax Court's finding that the option had no value
when granted, but held that the employee realized taxable in-
come in the year in which the stock was acquired, through exercise
of the option, in the amount of the difference between the option
price and the then market value of the stock. On rehearing,"'
taxpayer contended that he was taxable in 1938 when he exercised
the option and not when he received the stock in 1939. There
was a substantial increase in value between these years. The
Supreme Court again held that he was taxable when the stock
was received, not when he made his election and paid the option
price. The recent Supreme Court case of Commissioner v.
LoBue," 2 has also thrown new light on these stock option cases.
Here the corporation granted the employee an option to purchase
stock. The Court held that the gain should be measured by the
difference between the option price and the market value of
the stock at the time the option was exercised and not when the
option was granted. The court viewed as unwarranted the dis-
tinctions made in earlier cases between "proprietary" and "com-
pensatory" options, where it was held that if an option was
"proprietary" in nature, any increment in value between the
granting of the option and its exercise was not income. It is
believed that the distinction made in the Palmer and Choate
decisions as to whether the corporation intended to distribute
profits to the stockholders is likewise doomed to have a short
life and that any difference in the spread between the date when
the option is granted and when it is exercised will be held to be
a dividend to the stockholder on the basis of the rationale of the
LoBue case.
If the stock rights are not exercised, but sold, the Commis-
sioner has ruled as follows:1
3
[U]pon a sale of the rights ordinary income is realized.
... It is not believed that the amount of such income is
measured by the value of the rights at the time of receipt
111324 U.S. 695 (1945).
112 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
113 Supra note 101.
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thereof. In the opinion of this office, the entire amount re-
ceived upon the sale of the rights is taxable as ordinary
income. (Emphasis added).
The ruling cited Gibson v. Commissioner.114 However, it does
not appear that Gibson entirely supports the Commissioner.
There the rights received by the taxpayer had a value of $12,255
on the date of receipt. She did not exercise the rights, but in-
stead sold them for $13,728.04. The court upheld the Commis-
sioner's determination that $12,255 was a dividend stating:"',
Since the option gives a privilege of obtaining income to
the extent of the spread between the market value of the
stock at the time of issuance of the option and the option
price for the stock, the proceeds of sale, at least to this
extent, constitute income. (Emphasis added).
In this case the Commissioner raised no objection to treating the
excess of $1,473 as a capital gain and the court did not consider
this question. However, the court did indicate that the spread
at the date of granting the option was income. The foregoing
ruling does indicate that in any subsequent cases such excess
will not be considered capital gains." 6
' 114 133 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1943).
. 115 I. at 309.
116 Some relief may be obtained under the provisions of sec. 421 of the 1954
Code. First enacted in 1950, this provision was provided for the purpose of allow-
ing corporations to provide incentives to corporate officers by the sale of stock
to'them in the corporation. When an option qualifies as a "restricted stock option"
under this section, no tax is imposed at the time the option is granted or exer-
cised. Instead the tax is deferred until the stock is sold and at that time if certain
conditions are met, any gain realized is a capital gain. The two most important
conditions are that: (1) the option price must be at least 85% of the fair market
value of the stock at the time the option is granted and (2) such individual must
not own stock possessing more than 10 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock of the employer corporation or of its parent or sub-
sidiary. The latter requirement, however, would effectively foreclose its use by
many closely held corporations.
